Abstract The paper explains response particles like yes and no as anaphoric elements that pick up propositional discourse referents that are introduced by preceding sentences. It is argued that negated antecedent clauses introduce two propositional discourse referents, which results in ambiguities of answers that are partly resolved by pragmatic optimization. The paper also discusses response particles like okay, right, uh-huh, uh-uh, and German ja, nein and doch. 
Introduction
There is a -perhaps naïve -conviction that response particles, also called polarity particles, like yes and no are particularly simple and straightforward, as the following quote from the gospel of St. Matthew (King James translation) shows.
(1) But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil. (Matthew 5:37) To think of yes and no as simple may be reasonable for responses to assertions and questions as in (2). But things get messy with responses to antecedents that contain a negation as in (3), where different continuations with elliptical clauses are possible. In contrast, the response particle yes is featureless, allowing for the following use in addition to the one mentioned in (4): One problem of this account is that it predicts the answer (7) to be possible. Another problem is that the distribution of elliptical clauses with and without response particles is different in embedded contexts, as in (8) 
Semantic approach: Farkas & Roelofsen 2012
Farkas & Roelofsen 2012 couch their theory within inquisitive semantics and the theory of communication in Farkas & Bruce 2010 . Glossing over details, assertions makes salient one proposition, cf. (9), whereas polarity questions introduce two propositions, one the negation of the other, as in Hamblin semantics, cf. (10). (9) It is assumed that one of the propositions is highlighted (here represented by boldface); this is the proposition mentioned by the sentence, which provides the target of the response particles. The response particles have the following semantics:
(11) a. yes: confirms highlighted proposition; reverses (= negates) highlighted negative propositions. b. no: confirms highlighted negative proposition; reverses (= negates) highlighted propositions.
This predicts the answer patterns in (2) and (3). However, notice that (11) requires two devices extraneous to the truth-conditional semantics of questions: the highlighting of propositions, and their identification as negated (as suggested in Situation Semantics, cf. Ginzburg & Sag 2000 , Cooper & Ginzburg 2011 . Farkas & Roelofson 2012 are aware of this deficiency of purely truth-conditional representations, and suggest in passing the use of propositional discourse referents marked for negation; this will be a crucial feature of the account presented here. (14) is fairly complex. In the theory proposed in the following, suggestions by Farkas & Roelofson that response particles are anaphoric expressions are worked out in greater detail, and the complexity that we observe in the use of these particles will be explained as resulting from independently motivated complexities in the way their antecedents are introduced.
Response particles as anaphora

Propositional discourse referents
In the theory proposed here, response particles are not related to a prejacent clause that is anaphoric to an antecedent clause, but they are anaphors themselves. That is, they pick up discourse referents that are anchored to salient propositions. Such propositional discourse referents have been assumed by a number of authors, e.g. by Asher 1986 , Cornish 1992 , Geurts 1998 and Frank 1996 . For example, propositions can be taken up by pronouns, as in (17) Negative quantifiers behave like sentential negation, introducing a non-negated proposition. In (27), this refers to 'someone has deciphered Rongorongo'.
(27) Nobody has ever deciphered Rongorongo, the writing of Easter Island, even though this has sometimes been claimed.
The examples given here show that we have to assume discourse referents for sentential objects, to explain the interpretation of anaphoric pronouns like it and that. Now, what are the semantic objects that these discourse referents are anchored to? A minimal view is that they are anchored to propositions that just capture the truth value of clauses, as in Heim 1992 . A maximal view is that they stand for full-fledged representational objects, as in Asher 1986 . An intermediate view is that they consist of propositions plus a sequence of discourse referents, the ones that are introduced by the clause that expresses that proposition, as in Frank 1996 and Geurts 1998 . This representation is necessary, as pronouns referring to propositional discourse referents can make accessible the discourse referents introduced by indefinite expressions in their scope, as in the following example:
(28) Ede probably didn't buy a car. And if this were true, he would have sold it.
We assume that propositional discourse referents that are introduced by a NegP receive a formal feature [neg] . This is a feature similar to gender in gender languages. E.g. in German, a discourse referent introduced by eine Gabel 'a fork' has to be marked as [feminine] , and is picked up by an agreeing pronoun, sie. In a similar way, as suggested by Farkas & Roelofson 2012 , discourse referents introduced by negated clauses are formally marked as negative, as in (29); this will determine the range of particles that can pick up such discourse referents, e.g. the German particle doch; see below.
Before we turn to the choice of particles we will have a closer look at the pronominal expressions that pick up propositional discourse referents.
Propositional anaphora: DPs, TPs and ActPs
We have seen examples of pronouns and demonstratives like it, this and that that are able to take up propositional discourse referents. In addition to these anaphoric expressions of category DP, there are anaphoric expressions that appear to be of category TP, namely so and not (pace Cornish 1992, who The verb believe also allows for a DP complement, cf. believe the rumor that…, and so we also find propositional DP anaphors like this in that position. I would like to propose that yes and no are also anaphors that pick up propositional discourse referents; this corresponds to Ginzburg & Sag 2000 , who call them "propositional lexemes" (however, they analyze these particles as adverbials). In contrast to so, yes and no are of the type ActP. In particular, I assume the following: We cannot assume that yes and no simply pick up a propositional discourse referent d because they do not easily fit into syntactic slots reserved for TPs: Hence we have to assume that the particles ja and nein pick up a propositional discourse referent, which then can be asserted. For English yes and no, the assertion is already part of the meaning itself:
As a consequence, the notion "response particle" makes sense for English yes and no, but not necessarily for German. In German, the particles ja and nein can be used for responses, as in (34) The response sometimes yes is hardly acceptable, in contrast to yes, sometimes. This can be derived from the fact that the quantifier sometimes does not easily scope out of the speech act (except in a reading difficult to obtain, meaning 'sometimes the answer is yes'). In contrast, German allows for both options, in particular for manchmal ja. This is predicted if ja is a propositional TP, over which the quantifier sometimes can scope (with the meaning: the proposition 'Ede steals cookies' is true at some indices , and apply it to the topic, e.g. Gianni. Polarity fragment answers also occur as partial answers to questions like Gli bambini hanno già cenato? 'Did the children eat al-ready?'; here the response particle may take up the proposition 'the children have eaten', which is restricted by the free topic, Gianni.
Other ways of responding
The focus of this article is on the response particles yes and no, but it should be noted that there are other ways of responding to an assertion. Here, I will give a quick overview of how some prominent ways to respond can be dealt with.
One option is to use modal adverbials like maybe. I assume that they are remnants of elliptical clauses, as illustrated in (39) In German, response particles may be combined with aber 'but', as in aber ja/nein/doch, which is expected if the adversative conjunction aber applies to TPs or to ActPs (English equivalents roughly are oh yes/no, with an interjection oh that is outside the ActP). Aber expresses some contrast to the targeted speech act. This allows the use of aber in responses to assertions (43)(a,b), and biased questions, (d,e), but disfavors it for non-biased questions, cf. (c). (43) The effects are fairly subtle, especially for (c), as the antecedent question can easily be shifted to a biased reading, and then aber is fine. The adversative particle expresses a connotation like: How could you even think of this (the biased) possibility! The results are reminiscent to the more robust effects of the Romanian particle ba, analyzed in Farkas 2010 as involving prejacent propositions. Another speechact related response option is by right and wrong. These particles arguably do not take up a propositional discourse referent, but rather the discourse referent introduced by a speech act, and evaluate it as being justified or not. The evaluation as right states that the speech act was justified, e.g. that the speaker would also commit to the asserted proposition. Consequently, right (and wrong) only allow for one reading for antecedent sentences that are negated, as in (44), which proposes two distinct analyses for right as remnant of an elliptical clause or as a response particle with the same overall meaning. (44) Naturally, right and wrong are awkward with non-biased questions; all that they could mean in this context is that the act of posing the questions was justified or not. With biased questions, right and wrong apply to the assertion of the proposition that the question is biased to. We can understand this in such a way that the speaker of a biased question, like the declarative question Ede stole a cookie?, influences the addressee to make the corresponding assertion, here Ede stole the cookie. The response right then expresses that this attempt is justified, which is tantamount to saying that the addressee actually would make this assertion.
Yet another type of response is by okay (according to the OED, first recorded mention in 1839 as an acronym of all known). Just like right, it cannot answer a non-biased question, and hence should react to the speech act rather than to the proposition of an antecedent clause. As a consequence, just as right, it never targets the inner proposition in a negated sentence. But it does not commit the utterer to the proposition expressed by the speech act itself (Farkas, pers. comm.) . With okay, speaker B just indicates compliance with what speaker A wants, namely that the proposition becomes part of the common ground.
This meaning of okay can be captured if we assume that an assertion consists of two separate operations (cf. also Krifka, to app.): first, a conversational move in which the speaker commits to the truth of the proposition, and second, one in which the speaker intends to make the proposition part of the common ground. These two moves would introduce distinct discourse referents. This is illustrated in (45), where the ASSERT operator is expressed by the conjunction of two simpler moves, CM for the event of creating A's commitment to the proposition 'Ede stole the cookie', and CG for the event of A's attempt to make this proposition part of the current common ground of A and B ("putting the proposition on the table", in the terminology of Farkas & Bruce 2010) . (45) The idea is that with antecedent assertions, a yes answer could, in principle, just express compliance, similar to okay. If the speaker intends the stronger reading that he himself is committed towards the proposition, then the more specific answer yes he did is preferred. The compliance reading of yes, and the non-compliance reading of no, can be derived as follows: Assume that the operator CG expresses that a proposition, here 'Ede stole the cookie', is part of the common ground. The discourse referent d′ in (45) then would be propositional, and yes and no could be understood just as in (31): yes asserts that the proposition 'Ede stole the cookie' indeed is in the common ground; notice that this does not commit speaker B to the truth of this proposition. And no would assert that it is not; again, B would not be committed to the truth of the negation of the proposition; B could just express that there aren't sufficient reasons to assume B. This use of no could also explain the no of surprise, as in No!, equivalent to That's not true! that, without really challenging the authority of the speaker, expresses an unwillingness to accept a proposition into the common ground without further elaboration. There are also paralinguistic ways of responses, that is, ways that do not correspond to the standard phonology of English (cf. Ward 2006) . There is what the OED literalizes as uh-huh, often with raising tone pattern, and as uh-uh, with glottal stops and downstep tone pattern. In contrast to okay, uh-huh can be used as an answer to a polarity question, just as uh-uh, cf. The use of uh-huh and uh-uh as reactions to questions shows that these responses can commit the utterer to a proposition. This is also evident for uh-uh as a negative response to an assertion, as in (48) The status of uh-huh as a response to an assertion appears to be ambiguous between compliance reading, like okay, and the committing reading as in (47). However, just as the simple yes, cf. (46a), the committing interpretation of uh-huh is somewhat marginal in this case, and eclipsed by the complying interpretation, perhaps even more so than yes. We can summarize these observations by the hypothesis that uh-huh and uhuh mean the same as yes and no. However, the syntactic categories are clearly distinct; responses like uh-huh, he did or uh-uh, he didn't are rather unusual. These paralinguistic response particles also cannot occur in embedded positions in German, as in conditional clauses or as complements of propositional attitude verbs, different from ja and nein, cf. wenn ja, but *wenn uh-uh. The relation between these paralinguistic signals to yes and no are similar to huh? vs. what? in requests for repeating a prior utterance.
In concluding this section, it should be pointed out that in addition to verbal responses, there are also non-verbal ones, e.g. the head nod for agreeing answers and the head shake for non-agreeing answers in Western European cultures. In general, the range of such reactions to different kinds of speech acts is a field still largely unexplored in formal semantics and pragmatics.
Optimal Choice of Polarity Particles
In the preceding section I have proposed that response particles, in particular yes and no, pick up propositional discourse referents and assert them, or assert their negation. In this section we will consider the optimal choice of such particles, in particular with negated antecedent clauses.
Yes and no as responses to negated propositions
Recall the analysis of assertions of negated clauses. In (49) The response particles yes and no can pick up either discourse referent, d′ or d, resulting in four possible analyses. As we have seen before, some of these interpretations require an additional elliptical clause or a particular rejecting accent. How can we explain these preferences? I suggest that there are two pragmatic markedness principles that are operative which jointly generate the observed pattern. First, disagreement with the first speaker must be marked; this explains the rejecting accent pattern and the strong tendency to use the response particles together with an elliptical clause. Second, the two propositional discourse referents differ in their salience. One would perhaps be inclined to think that the NegP referent, d, is more salient than the TP discourse referent, d′, as the latter is introduced within the scope of the expression that introduces d. However, in typical cases in which a negated clause is asserted, the non-negated proposition will already be salient in the context. For example, it is hard to imagine that a sentence like Ede didn't steal the cookie could be uttered in a context in which the proposition 'Ede stole the cookie' is not salient already, e.g. as a possible explanation why the cookie is lacking. Hence we can assume the following two constraints:
(51) a. *NEGDR: Penalizes picking up a negatively marked discourse referent.
b. *DISAGR: Penalizes disagreement with the other speaker.
The competition between the two constraints can be visualized in an OT tableau. We can plausibly assume that violations of *DISAGR are ranked higher than violations of *NEGDR.
(52) Calculation of optimal forms in an OT tableau, antecedent: assertion (49).
expression reference resulting meaning *DISAGR *NEGDR Favorite a yes d′ 'He did.'
The optimal candidate is no in (c). This predicts that the simple response particle no will have this reading. Hence if no should express reading (d), it must be specified with an elliptical clause. For yes, we have a ranking-dependent preference for (b) over (a). This predicts that yes will be preferably used with the same interpretation as no. But as the two interpretations in (a) and (b) differ only slightly, a clarifying elliptical clause is usually required to express these meanings. The reactions are similar as to negated assertions, except that yes is more naturally interpreted as 'he did ' (cf. Holmberg 2012) . This would follow from the plausible assumption that questions based on negated propositions do express a bias, but a weaker one than assertions. Hence the constraint *DISAGR is ranked lower, leading to a preference for line (a) over line (b) in diagram (52).
The preference for the non-negated discourse referent d′ was motivated by the fact that negated antecedent clauses typically occur in contexts in which the nonnegated proposition is salient. In contexts in which this condition is not satisfied, we should expect the answer patterns to be different. This is indeed the case: (54) Here the negated discourse referent d now is more salient. When we assume instead of *NEGDR a constraint *NONSAL which penalizes reference to less-salient discourse referents, this would result in yes meaning 'he didn't' as the most optimal answer. Polarity questions containing a focus as in (55) 
Responses to questions with syntactically high negation
There is another type of negation in questions, first identified by Ladd 1981, in which negation occurs at a syntactically higher position, as in (56). The syntactic analysis (56) captures Ladd's intuition that the negation in such questions is not propositional negation. It follows Krifka (to appear), who argues that with such questions, a speaker requests the denegation of an assertion. In the case at hand, the speaker asks the addressee to exclude the assertion that Ede stole some cookies. This move can be performed, for example, when the speaker is inclined to believe that Ede stole some cookies, and wants to check whether the addressee would comply with this by eliminating any reason to assert the opposite. What is important for our purpose is that negation is interpreted at the level of speech acts, and not as propositional negation. Hence no propositional discourse referent for the negated proposition is introduced. Hence such questions are similar to assertions, and we do not find any ambiguity for the answers yes and no: As for the meaning of doch, I assume that doch presupposes that two propositional discourse referents are salient, one the negation of the other, and that doch takes up the non-negated discourse referent and asserts it (cf. Karagjosova 2006 , who argues that doch contrastively focuses on a proposition p, requiring an alternative set {p, ¬p}). As argued for in (29), negated discourse referents can be identified due to a feature [neg] . Alternatively, we might say that doch picks up the negated discourse referent and negates it. But in this case nominal discourse referents that are introduced in the antecedent clause would not be accessible after doch picks up that discourse referent, as negation limits the lifespan of discourse referents. But in fact they are: The specific presupposition of doch (expressed by a constraint PRES) creates a competition with the particles yes and no. In particular, the use of the particle yes for picking up the non-negated discourse referent is blocked by doch. This can be expressed in OT tableaux in the fashion of Beaver 2004, who treats a similar situation, the blocking of taking up salient discourse referents by simpler expressions. Following Beaver, I assume a meta-constraint BLOCK that is marked by the presence of an expression for which the indicated interpretation is strongly preferred.
(62) Optimal forms in an OT tableau; negated antecedent clause in German; DISAGR is irrelevant if ordered under BLOCK.
expression reference meaningBut as Farkas & Roelofsen (2012) 
Yes.
The reason why yes and no are acceptable is that they would result in the same information when applied to either disjunct. In the first disjunct, only one propositional discourse referent is introduced, d1; in the second, there are two propositional discourse referents, where d2 is preferred over d2′. But notice that d1 and d2 are anchored to the same proposition, and hence picking up either one by yes or no would convey the same meaning.
